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DSA Article 18 – when must hosting services report suspected crimes?

When does DSA Article 18 require a hosting service to notify authorities about suspected crimes threatening life or safety? Practical guide to police, Member States, evidence and reporting.
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DSA Article 18 – when must hosting services report suspected crimes?

Short answer: Under Article 18 of the EU Digital Services Act (DSA), a hosting service provider must promptly notify the relevant law-enforcement or judicial authorities when it becomes aware of information giving rise to a suspicion of a criminal offence involving a threat to a person's life or safety. The offence may have taken place, be ongoing or be likely to take place. A criminal conviction is not required, but not every illegal post automatically triggers Article 18. Under Chapter 2, Section 3 of Sweden's Act (2024:954), such notifications in Sweden must be made to Polismyndigheten (the Swedish Police Authority).

Editorial legal fact-check: 16 November 2026. Sources: Regulation (EU) 2022/2065, Article 18 and recital 56, and Swedish supplementary law. General information, not individual legal advice or an official reporting form.

Which services are subject to Article 18?

Article 18 addresses providers of hosting services, which store information supplied by a service recipient at that recipient's request. Examples can include platforms with user posts, forums, relevant online marketplaces and other hosting services. An ordinary online shop displaying only its own product descriptions is not automatically a hosting provider for that content. Examine what the service actually does and its legal role.

The obligation arises when the provider becomes aware of information giving rise to the particular suspicion. The DSA does not itself create a general duty to profile users to look for crimes. Recital 56 expressly states that it does not provide a legal basis for profiling service recipients for this purpose.

Decision matrix: when might Article 18 apply?

This table supports internal triage. It is not a substitute for applying the actual legal criteria to the individual case.

SituationArticle 18?Action
A hosting provider receives concrete information suggesting a serious imminent violent offence threatening a person's safety.Potentially. Assess the threat to life or safety; a conviction is unnecessary.Promptly notify the relevant authorities with the available relevant facts; deal with an emergency separately.
Information suggests human trafficking or serious abuse that threatens people's safety.Potentially. Recital 56 cites examples; the threat criterion still matters.Assess the facts, Member State concerned and secure transfer without circulating sensitive material unnecessarily.
A misleading advertisement may breach commercial rules, but no information indicates a threat to life or safety.Not automatically. Illegality alone is insufficient.Consider other procedures, such as Article 16 on notice and action.
A platform suspends an account for repeated terms-of-service violations, without a qualifying suspected crime.Not automatically. Account moderation is a separate issue.Consider Article 17's statement-of-reasons duty.
Concrete information identifies more than one Member State concerned.Several States may be relevant.Identify and notify the competent authorities in all Member States concerned.

Suspicion versus established criminal liability

The provider is not expected to conduct a criminal trial or establish guilt. It must nevertheless have information it actually became aware of that gives rise to a suspicion of an offence involving a threat to life or safety. Separate observed content, users' claims and the provider's own inferences when documenting the assessment.

Article 18 does not set a universal deadline of 24 or 72 hours; it requires prompt notification. Internal forms or approvals must not unnecessarily delay the report once the conditions are met. Where danger is immediate, follow appropriate emergency and safeguarding procedures straight away.

Which authority should receive the notification?

Article 18(1) requires notification to law-enforcement or judicial authorities of the Member State or States concerned. A State is concerned if the offence is suspected to have occurred, be occurring or be likely to occur there, or if the suspected offender or victim resides or is located there. More than one country can qualify.

Sweden: Under Chapter 2, Section 3 of Act (2024:954), notifications under Article 18(1) must be made to the Swedish Police Authority (Polismyndigheten). The Swedish Post and Telecom Authority (PTS) coordinates DSA supervision and complaints, but it is not the designated recipient for Article 18 reports under that Swedish provision.

If the Member State cannot be identified with reasonable certainty: Article 18(2) requires contacting the law-enforcement authorities in the State where the provider is established or its legal representative resides or is established, or Europol, or both. Do not routinely use this fallback instead of an identified concerned Member State.

On 30 September 2026 the European Commission published its contact-point list for Article 18 notifications. Verify the destination and secure communication channel each time; do not rely on a copied address from an old template.

For immediate danger in Sweden, follow current police emergency instructions, normally 112. An emergency call is an immediate protective action; do not assume it automatically completes every Article 18 information requirement.

Seven steps: from first signal to documented notification

  1. Receive and safeguard the signal: record a case ID, when the information became known, the receiving team and source type; restrict access to sensitive materials.
  2. Assess scope: is this a hosting service under the DSA and does the available information indicate a suspected offence threatening life or safety? If not, follow the other applicable procedure.
  3. Record the facts: distinguish content, relevant links, users and timestamps from internal assumptions; retain time-zone details where relevant.
  4. Identify Member States: consider the offence location, suspected offender's location and victim's location. Record uncertainty; use Article 18(2) only where a concerned State cannot be identified with reasonable certainty.
  5. Verify the contact route: check current official contact details and secure transfer instructions. Handle urgent danger in parallel.
  6. Notify promptly: send the suspicion and all relevant information available via an appropriate channel. Record actual sending, recipient and acknowledgement. A completed internal form is not a delivered report.
  7. Follow up securely: document transferred files, subsequent contacts, access permissions, retention needs and requested supplements, while respecting GDPR and other applicable rules.

The steps are recommended internal controls, not a mandatory Word, PDF or Excel format imposed by Article 18.

Two illustrative scenarios

Scenario A: a forum receives a concrete warning

A forum is notified of specific information indicating a serious threat to a person's safety. Moderators assess the information, preserve relevant timestamps and escalate promptly to the team responsible for contacting authorities. If Sweden is concerned, an Article 18 notification goes to the Swedish Police Authority, with separate emergency action if necessary. The platform does not need to prove that the suspected offence will occur.

Scenario B: a marketplace sees an unlawful advertisement

A marketplace receives a complaint about an advertisement possibly breaching marketing rules, without concrete information about a criminal threat to life or safety. That is not enough by itself for Article 18. Other notice-and-action or legal duties may apply. The assessment may change if further information reveals a qualifying danger to persons.

Evidence, privacy and secure transmission

Article 18 requires provision of all relevant information available. Recital 56 mentions content, publication time and time zone where available, an explanation of the suspicion and information needed to locate and identify the relevant user. It does not permit fabricating information or general profiling for criminal investigation.

Apply access controls; record who handled information, versions and actual transfers. Do not upload highly sensitive material to open spreadsheets, shared email threads or AI tools without appropriate legal and security review. GDPR and other relevant EU and national rules on privacy and fundamental rights remain applicable.

Do not confuse Article 18 with other DSA duties

Article 16: notice-and-action reports about illegal content. Such a report might also provide information triggering Article 18, but the tests differ.

Article 17: statements of reasons for content or account restrictions. Informing a user of a moderation decision is different from notifying law enforcement.

Article 20: internal complaint systems for applicable online platforms. Articles 9 and 10 concern authority orders, while Article 24 includes transparency reporting; none replaces the specific Article 18 process.

Frequently asked questions

Must the suspected crime be proven?

No. The duty concerns information giving rise to a qualifying suspicion, not a conviction or the provider's own finding of guilt.

Must every illegal post be reported to police under Article 18?

No. Article 18 concerns suspected offences involving threats to life or safety. Other illegal content may be subject to different rules.

Is there a 24- or 72-hour deadline?

No general such deadline is specified in Article 18. The duty is to notify promptly, independently of deadlines for other types of incident reporting.

Can an Excel case log replace notification?

No. An internal register supports case handling but does not itself deliver information to an authority. Keep proof of actual transmission.

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